Public Policy and Leadership Faculty
Publications

School of Public Policy and Leadership

2005

Technical risk information: Decision tool or rhetorical
ammunition? Undisputed facts in the Yucca Mountain debate
David M. Hassenzahl
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, david.hassenzahl@unlv.edu

Denise Tillery
Paulette Laidler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/sea_fac_articles
Part of the Nuclear Commons, Oil, Gas, and Energy Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation
Commons, and the Rhetoric Commons

Repository Citation
Hassenzahl, D. M., Tillery, D., Laidler, P. (2005). Technical risk information: Decision tool or rhetorical
ammunition? Undisputed facts in the Yucca Mountain debate. International Symposium on Technology
and Society 33-36. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ISTAS.2005.1452710

This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Article in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Article has been accepted for inclusion in Public Policy and Leadership Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

Technical Risk Information: Decision Tool or
Rhetorical Ammunition? Undisputed Facts in the
Yucca Mountain Debate
David M. Hassenzahl, Ph.D.
Department of Environmental Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Las Vegas NV 89154-4030
david.hassenzahl@ccmail.nevada.edu
Denise Tillery, Ph.D.
Department of English,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Abstract
This paper examines how both opponents and
proponents of the proposed high-level nuclear waste
repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada claim that
uncontroversial information supports their conflicting
positions. Four pieces of information in particular are
claimed by both sides: the distance of the proposed site
from Las Vegas, the volume of waste that has been
produced, the threat of terrorism since 9/11/01, and the
occurrence of an earthquake in early 2002. Possible
explanations for the difference include Naïve Positivism,
Social Constructionism, Persistent Beliefs and Implicit
Warrants. The latter two models better explain observed
knowledge / preference states. If so, more or better
information alone will not improve the dialog about
Yucca Mountain. Rather, dialog should include a
discussion of the ways in which they interpret information
and draw conclusions based on their beliefs and
warrants. This conclusion may be generalized to a range
of information-intensive risk decisions

1. Introduction
Since the early 1980’s Yucca Mountain in Nevada has
been the single site under consideration as the future
repository for civilian high-level radioactive waste. A
variety of governmental, non-profit, individual and
commercial stakeholders have engaged in intense and
often inflammatory debate about the site selection process.
Each side claims that existing technical information about
the site supports its position. Each side claims that the
other side is either ignorant about the information, or is
disingenuous in its use of information.
Both of these claims imply that technical information
can determine whether or not to open Yucca Mountain to
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nuclear waste. For example both Al Gore and George W.
Bush, in their 2000 campaign tours through Nevada,
claimed that they would “let the science decide” about
Yucca Mountain. Subsequently, the Bush administration
has claimed [1] that the science supports his decision to go
forward with the project, while opponents complain that he
has reneged on his promise to rely on science. Greenspun
[2], for examples, asserts Bush relies on bad information,
and in light of recent scandals, “it can no longer be claimed
by anyone that the science is sound.”
Several possible conditions could explain why opposing
sides of a contested issue argue that technical information
supports their positions. One is that one side or the other is
truly ignorant. This is the most commonly heard argument
from the two sides in this debate [3],[4]. Another possible
explanation is that of social constructionism, in which
"truth" is seen as being constructed through discourse, and a
discourse community's view of "truth" is influenced by both
beliefs and evidence. In this case, there are two different
discourse communities--those who favor Yucca Mountain
and those opposed. The two differ in their beliefs, values,
and languages; therefore, they have little common ground
from which to engage in productive dialogue [5]. A final,
largely neglected possibility is that the two sides agree on
the information, are unaware of such agreement, and
disagree on how to interpret information.
This paper explores the final possibility. We argue that,
so long as opposing sides wield agreed-upon information
about Yucca Mountain to support their positions, debate
about the technical merits of the site is unlikely to improve
stakeholder dialog. We consider several possible models to
explain disagreement: two versions of a “Naïve Positivist”
model, a “Social Constructionist” model, a “Persistent
Belief” model, and an “Implicit Warrants” model. We
conclude that the Naïve Positivist model is held by
individuals of both sides in the debate, but that neither is
supported by observed combinations of knowledge and

preference. The Social Constructionist model does not
explain the cases we review, since there is no claimed
disagreement on the truth. Both the Persistent Belief and
Implicit Warrants models better explain existing
knowledge and preference. The Yucca Mountain decision
process will be best served by addressing preferences and
beliefs. Further analysis, even if undisputed, will continue
to undermine the process.

2. Three Models of Knowledge and
Preference
2.1. The Naïve Positivist Model(s)
Shrader-Frechette [6] identifies nuclear power
advocates as “Naïve Positivists,” in that they insist that
technical information about nuclear power necessarily will
favor nuclear power, and that ignorance about technical
information best explains opposition. We consider this
model in the context of the Yucca Mountain Project.
Implied in this model (Table 1) is that informed
individuals will only be found in the upper right quadrant,
where knowledge intersects with support for opening
Yucca Mountain. The uninformed could be found in either
of the two left quadrants. Resolving the current conflict on
Yucca Mountain, then, would be best effected though
education, since learning would move people from the left
to the upper right.
Table 1.

Naïve Positivist Matrix: Advocates
Ignorant

Knowledgeable

For

Possible

Some

Against

Some

No one

The inverse (Table 2), not suggested by ShraderFrechette but certainly implicit among Yucca Mountain
opponents, is a Naïve Positivist position against Yucca
Mountain. Here, technical information answers the Yucca
Mountain question in the negative: the best available
information belies the credibility of the project. Again,
education is the solution. The implication of this model is
that only the lower of the two right-hand quadrants can be
populated, and learning will move individuals from either
quadrant on the left to the lower right quadrant.
Table 2.

Naïve Positivist Matrix: Opponents
Ignorant

Knowledgeable

For

Some

No one

Against

Possible

Some

Either of the Naïve Positivist models would be
validated by first determining whether there is general
agreement about what constitutes information, observing
whether informed individuals fall only in one of the two
quadrants to the right, and evaluating whether learning

moves individual from the left into the populated quadrant
on the right.

2.2. The Social Constructionist Model
In the Social-Constructionist Model (Table 3), any of
the four quadrants can be populated. Of key importance is
that the source and nature of information in the upper right
hand quadrant differs from that in the lower right hand
quadrant. Learning could not shift individuals already on
the right up or down, since the nature of that information
will be dependent upon their preferences for or against
Yucca Mountain. It would be possible (but unlikely) for
people on the left to move up or down as they chose which
information to accept, or if they accept either information or
values from the other.
Table 3.

Social Constructionist Matrix
Ignorant

Knowledgeable

For

Some

Some

Against

Some

Some

2.3. The Persistent Belief Model
Baron [7] posits that people frequently use information
uncritically to bolster their established beliefs. He observes
“irrational persistence of beliefs” among individuals who
hold on to beliefs in the face of information that they should
accept and that should undermine their beliefs. We adopt
his language to propose the “Persistent Belief” model
(Table 4). If we apply this to the Yucca Mountain case, we
assume that individuals have established preferences for or
against Yucca Mountain. New information is not
interpreted critically, but is automatically assumed to
support existing positions. While everyone on the right is
equally well informed, some or all of those individuals have
not thought critically about the meaning of that information.
Critical thinking could move individuals on the right up or
down.
Table 4.

Persistent Beliefs Matrix

For

Ignorant
Some

Knowledgeable
Some

Against

Some

Some

2.4. The Implicit Warrants Model
The logical theory of Stephen Toulmin [8] suggests that
individuals move from data, or available evidence, to
conclusions by means of warrants, or general propositions
that are not stated explicitly. Data answers the question,
what have you got to go on?, while warrants answer the
question, how did you get there?, or how did you draw a
conclusion from a given piece of data? Warrants, as
Toulmin explains, are field-dependent; that is, the context
that surrounds an argument—i.e., its field—will determine
the nature of the argument [9]. Different arguments can be

said to come from different fields if they rely on different
warrants to reach their conclusions, even if they rely on the
same evidence. In this case, individuals on the right will
move up or down only if they use different warrants; that
is, a different type of reasoning. Thus the final model we
consider here is the “Implicit Warrants” model (Table 5).
Table 5.

Implicit Warrants Matrix

For

Ignorant
Some

Knowledgeable
Some

Against

Some

Some

3. The “Facts” About Yucca Mountain
Here we consider four well-established pieces of
information about Yucca Mountain [10],[11].
The total amount of waste that will be interred at
Yucca Mountain
The distance from Yucca Mountain to the Las Vegas
metropolitan area
The history of earthquakes near Yucca Mountain
The heightened concern about terrorism since
September 11, 2001
Each of these four points has been used in arguments
for and against the establishment of Yucca Mountain as
the nation’s high-level civilian waste repository. We
describe each case, and note how the information has been
used by the two sides of the Yucca Mountain debate.
By 2000, civilian reactors had generated about 25,000
cubic yards of waste slated for Yucca Mountain. Wolfe
[12] used this figure to argue in favor of the Yucca
Mountain Project, while Flynn et al [13] felt is was a
reason to hold off on the project. Interesting, both
employed the same analogy, describing the waste in
vertical feet covering a football field.
Yucca Mountain is located about 90 miles northwest of
Las Vegas, at the northern edge of the Nevada Test site. In
2001, a number of students were interviewed session for
the “Silver State 100,” a selection process to identify the
top 100 high school seniors in Nevada 2001. To evaluate
their critical thinking skills, they were asked to argue their
position for or against the Yucca Mountain Project.
Students arguing in opposition claimed that the site is
unacceptably close to Las Vegas, while those who favored
the site described it as in the middle of nowhere. One of
the authors (Hassenzahl) participated in this selection
process as an interviewer. The intent of the interviews was
not to gather data on how students use information, so this
is an observation, not formally recorded information.
A number of earthquakes have been recorded over the
past several decades within 20 miles of Yucca Mountain.
In 2002, an earthquake was centered 12 miles from the
site. This prompted two types of responses. A letter to the
editor of the Las Vegas Review Journal argued that this
should provide assurance, since no significant damage was
recorded at the site [14]. In contrast, the State of Nevada
official Yucca Mountain website identifies known
earthquakes as definitive disqualifying data [15].

Finally, since 2001, there has been increased concern
about terrorist use of a “dirty bomb” or physical dispersal of
high-level waste. Yucca Mountain Project advocates note
that because wastes are currently stored on-site in populated
parts of the country, it should be removed as soon as
possible to avoid terrorist attack [16]. Opponents observe
that waste will be transported through major metropolitan
centers on its way to Yucca Mountain, a concern that they
expect will eventually coalesce opposition around the
country [17],[18].

4. Discussion: Explaining Preferences for /
against Yucca Mountain
Each of the examples above indicates that the two sides
do appear to hold Naïve Positivist models. That is, both
opponents and advocate of the Yucca Mountain Project
claim that technical information supports their positions.
This contrasts with Shrader-Frechette’s [6] Naïve Positivist
model, in which only the YMP advocates hold Naïve
Positivist positions. Since the two sides appear to know and
agree on the information, neither version of the Naïve
Positivist model explains the observed knowledge /
preference matrix illustrated in Tables One through Five.
Since identical information is claimed as support for both
positions, neither side can learn the information and
consequently change preferences.
The Social Constructionist model also fails to explain
the differences observed here. The two sides do not claim
different knowledge in support of different positions.
Rather, they agree on the information, but disagree on
which preference set that information supports. What is
missing, however, is the link between the information and
the claim, which suggests that the Persistent Belief and
Implicit Warrants models merit further consideration.
Under the Persistent Belief model, individuals
unthinkingly adopt new information to buttress their
positions. This implies the possibility that carefully
considered information could change the beliefs of one side
(or both). For example, it seems unlikely that the amount of
waste generated to date, as a stand-alone value, could
obviously support either position. Yet both sides have
explicitly made such claims. Likewise, it is possible that
either current on-site storage or transportation could be
universally accepted as the greater hazard; both sides have
looked to the aspect of this issue that best supports their
positions.
In the Implicit Warrants model, individuals are using
the same sets of evidence to come to different conclusions
by using different warrants. Because data are generally
explicitly stated, whereas warrants are generally appealed to
implicitly, it is possible to take a particular piece of
information such as “Yucca Mountain is 100 miles from
Las Vegas,” and, by using the implicit warrant “it is likely
that the repository will leak,” or “waste being hauled
through Las Vegas is likely to spill” conclude that “Yucca
Mountain will threaten the city of Las Vegas.” On the other
hand, if one’s implicit warrant is “the science indicates that
Yucca Mountain will contain the waste for 10,000 years,”

then the evidence that “Yucca Mountain is 100 miles from
Las Vegas” leads to the conclusion that the city will be
safe. According to Toulmin’s theory, the two sides are in
fact existing in two separate argument fields. In this
model, it is necessary for each side to make their warrants
explicit—to explain the “backing” or credentials of the
warrant—and accept that the other side uses different
warrants in order for persuasion to occur, and for people to
change their positions.

5. Conclusions
The Persistent Belief and Implicit Warrants models
have received less attention in the literature than have the
two Naïve Positivist models and the Social Constructionist
model. Yet Persistent Beliefs, Implicit Warrants, or some
hybrid of the two, best explains the conflict. The main
strategy of Yucca Mountain advocates and opponents alike
is to promote more and better information. We conclude
that additional knowledge—without careful attention to its
context and origins—cannot plausibly lead to consensus,
and is likely to deepen disagreement.
More fruitful, then, is to probe for existing beliefs and
implicit warrants. Either advocates, opponents, or both
may be undermining their own preferences by not
considering alternatives. At the same time, both actively
undermine useful debate by accusing their counterparts of
ignorance and disingenuousness. While these two
characteristics can surely be found on both sides, they
probably are not as prevalent as often assumed.
Unfortunately, it will be very difficult to convince either
side to consider the possibility that they could change their
minds.
We do not argue that there is no contested information
about Yucca Mountain. The recent scandal over USGS
scientists possibly misrepresenting information about
groundwater flow through the site demonstrates the
complexities, tensions, and political nature of the science
at issue. However, it is clear that disagreement about
information is at best an incomplete explanation for the
existing conflict. Our conclusions do suggest that
consensus resolutions of informational disputes is unlikely
to improve stakeholder dialog, since whatever the
outcome, both sides will claim that their positions have
been bolstered.
Finally, we have provided cases, not an extensive
analysis. We have found examples that suggest knowledge
of individual facts, and the use of those facts to support
either position on Yucca Mountain. It is not clear how
knowledge / ignorance and preference are distributed
among the four quadrants among individuals in the general
population. Likewise, we cannot make claims about the
extent to which people in general believe that the four
items considered here support their preferences for or
against the project. However, preliminary analysis of some
recent data (Hassenzahl and Laidler, unpublished) suggests
that all four quadrants are at a minimum populated, and
that people do identify these four pieces of information as
supporting their preferences.
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